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Deception is related to the ability to inhibit prepotent responses and to engage in mental
tasks such as anticipating responses and inferring what another person knows, especially
in social contexts. However, the neural correlates of deception processing, which requires
mentalizing, remain unclear. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we
examined the neural correlates of deception, including mentalization, in social contexts in
normally developing children. Healthy right-handed children (aged 8–9 years) were scanned
while performing interactive games involving deception. The games varied along two
dimensions: the type of reply (deception and truth) and the type of context (social and less
social). Participants were instructed to deceive a witch and to tell the truth to a girl. Under
the social-context conditions, participants were asked to consider what they inferred about
protagonists’ preferences from their facial expressions when responding to questions.
Under the less-social-context conditions, participants did not need to consider others’
preferences. We found a significantly greater response in the right precuneus under the
social-context than under less-social-context conditions. Additionally, we found marginally
greater activation in the right inferior parietal lobule (IPL) under the deception than under
the truth condition. These results suggest that deception in a social context requires not
only inhibition of prepotent responses but also engagement in mentalizing processes. This
study provides the first evidence of the neural correlates of the mentalizing processes
involved in deception in normally developing children.
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INTRODUCTION
Deception is the process by which one individual deliberately
attempts to convince another to accept as true what the first indi-
vidual knows to be false (Spence et al., 2001). Deception itself is
related to the cognitive process whereby a true response is inhib-
ited and a deceptive one is produced (Abe et al., 2006). However,
deception, especially in social contexts, also involves intent to
instill false beliefs. The instillation of false beliefs requires that one
track the false beliefs that are being engendered in the other per-
son (Ship et al., 2008). Therefore, deception of another person
not only requires the inhibition of some responses and the pro-
duction of others; it also entails consideration of the knowledge
available to the other person, appreciation of another’s mental
state, and the ability to predict the behavior of another individ-
ual based on her or his mental state (Yirmiya et al., 1996; Ship
et al., 2008). To understand and manipulate other people’s behav-
ior in terms of their mental state are cognitive skills known as
mentalizing (Frith et al., 1991; Frith and Frith, 1999). This ability
is required for deceptions that occur in a social context.
The results of previous behavioral experimental research
undertaken from a developmental perspective indicate that the
ability to engage in deception in a social context develops later
than do abilities related to inhibition andmentalizing. Ahern et al.
(2011) revealed that normally developing children aged 3 years
and 6 months could inhibit prepotent responses (factual state-
ments) and offer a counterfactual response without any intent to
deceive. Moreover, the ability to mentalize developed at around
4 years in normally developing children (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Wellman et al., 2001). In terms of deceptive behavior in social
contexts, normally developing children could deceive another
person at around 5 years of age (Sodian et al., 1991; Peskin,
1992). Additionally, several neurodevelopmental disorders, such
as autism spectrum disorders (ASD), involve deficits in mentaliz-
ing abilities. Previous studies on children with ASD have reported
robust results showing impairments in the ability to mentalize
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie and Frith, 1988; Happé, 1994)
and engage in deceptive behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Sodian
and Frith, 1992; Yirmiya et al., 1996; Li et al., 2010) in this pop-
ulation. However, little is known about the neural correlates of
deception andmentalizing, even in normally developing children.
Therefore, a neuroimaging study on normally developing chil-
dren would help to clarify the neural abnormalities involved in
neurodevelopmental disorders.
To the best of our knowledge, no neuroimaging studies have
been conducted on deception in a social context. Although a
number of studies on the neural correlates of deceptive behavior
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(Spence et al., 2001; Langleben et al., 2002, 2005; Lee et al., 2002;
Mohamed et al., 2006; Gamer et al., 2007; Abe et al., 2008; Hakun
et al., 2008; Baumgertner et al., 2009; Kozel et al., 2009) have
been conducted, these focused on the processes associated with
deception, and they targeted adults. These studies revealed that
deceptive responses were associated with increased activation in
prefrontal regions and the anterior cingulate cortex (Spence et al.,
2001; Langleben et al., 2002; Nunez et al., 2005; Abe et al., 2006;
Ganis et al., 2008). Abe et al. (2006) suggested that the dor-
solateral, ventrolateral, and medial prefrontal cortices; anterior
cingulate cortex; and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) were related to
response inhibition and production of deceptive replies. However,
the neural correlates of deception in social contexts have not been
well-studied, especially in children.
With respect to the processes associated with mentalizing, a
number of functional brain studies have reported that mentaliz-
ing involves an extended network located bilaterally in the frontal,
temporal, and parietal lobes. Previous studies reported activa-
tions which reflected that in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ)
was associated with reading intentions from action (Lissek et al.,
2008; Bahnemann et al., 2009), the superior temporal sulcus
(STS) was related to the processing of visual-spatial informa-
tion (Pelphrey et al., 2004; Bahnemann et al., 2009), and the
precuneus was related to adopting the perspective of another per-
son (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). The region from the medial
prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices to the paracingulate cor-
tex has been associated with making inferences about another’s
thoughts (Fletcher et al., 1995; Amodio and Frith, 2006).
Despite previous neuroimaging research that has clarified
the neural correlates of deception and mentalizing in adults,
questions about whether the neural correlates of deception and
mentalizing in normally developing children rely on same brain
regions as they do in adults remain unanswered. However, no
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study has yet
focused on deception in normally developing children in social
contexts. Thus, the aim of this study was to investigate whether
the neural correlates of deception and mentalizing in social con-
texts were the same in normally developing children as in adults.
We also examined whether the neural correlates of mentalizing
were modulated by reply type (deceptive or truthful statements).
To these ends, we conducted a rapid event-related fMRI exper-
iment using an interactive game that involved a set of animated
stimuli associated with deception. Two factors were studied: type
of reply (deception or truth) and type of context (social or less
social). We tested the following three hypotheses: (1) Activations
in the dorsolateral, ventrolateral, and medial prefrontal cortices;
anterior cingulate cortex; and IPL would be associated with the
main effect of deception. These activations would reflect inhi-
bition of prepotent response processing. (2) Activations in the
medial prefrontal cortex, STS, TPJ, temporal pole, and precuneus
would be associated with the main effect of social context and
would be related to perspective taking, inference, and anticipation
of themental state of another. (3) The brain regions underpinning
both deception and mentalizing would integrate the cognitive
operations required for deception in a social context. Ramnani
and Owen (2004) concluded that the medial aspect of the pre-
frontal cortex plays a key role in integrating the outcomes of two
or more separate cognitive operations in the pursuit of a higher-
level behavioral goal. Therefore, we assumed that the medial
aspect of the prefrontal cortex would be responsible for integrat-
ing the processing involved in deception andmentalizing and that
the development of this region would be related to the ability to
engage in deception in social contexts.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The sample consisted of 28 healthy children aged 8 or 9 years
(nine females; mean age = 8.9, SD = 0.59; mean IQ = 106.46,
SD = 10.29) recruited with local advertisements. All had nor-
mal vision, and none had a history of neurological or psychi-
atric illness. All participants were right-handed according to the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Their IQ was
assessed by the WISC-III. Data from six participants were dis-
carded due to excessive head motion (>3mm), and data from 12
other participants were discarded because of poor performance
on tasks (<70% accuracy; see Behavioral Results section). The
final sample therefore comprised 10 participants. Mean age was
113.4 months (SD = 12.5, range = 97–128). There was no group
difference between the final and discarded participants [M =
111.3, SD = 11.5; t(26) = 0.44, P = 0.66]. Additionally there was
no group difference in relation to full scale IQ [final participants:
M = 106.3, SD = 9.5, discarded sample: M = 106.9, SD = 10.9;
t(26) = 0.06, P = 0.95]. All children were paid for their partici-
pation. Each participant and his/her parent signed an informed
consent form. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee
of Tohoku University.
MATERIALS
Wemodified the behavioral experiment conducted by Sodian and
Frith (1992) and used two boxes for the animation (Figure 1).
The protagonists in the animation were a witch and a girl, and
we used blue and pink boxes featuring a window facing par-
ticipants to decrease memory load. Two kinds of fruit (chosen
randomly from apples, bananas, and oranges) appeared on a
table. In the first scene of the animation, a protagonist sat in
front of the table, on which the boxes and fruit were placed. Next,
the protagonist looked at one fruit with a smile or an expres-
sion reflecting disgust. She then looked at the other fruit with
a facial expression opposite the first (if she smiled at the first
fruit, she expressed disgust toward the second). These procedures
allowed participants to judge which fruit the protagonist liked
and which she disliked. Next, the fruit “jumped” into the boxes
after a curtain was drawn. Because the protagonists were behind
the curtain, they were unable to see which box contained which
fruit. However, participants were able to view this sequence of
events. In the last scene, the curtain opened and the protagonist
asked participants which box contained which fruit. Under the
deception with social-context (DS) and truth with social-context
(TS) conditions, protagonists asked participants about the posi-
tion of their favorite fruit: “Is my favorite fruit in the pink box?”
Under these conditions, participants should have been able to
infer the protagonist’s preference from his or her facial expres-
sion and use this information to answer the question correctly.
On the other hand, under the deception with less-social-context
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FIGURE 1 | Time courses for (A) deception with social-context (DS),
(B) deception with less-social-context (DL), (C) truth with social-context
(TS), and (D) truth with less-social-context (TL). Participants were
instructed to respond truthfully to the girl’s questions and to deceive the
witch. Under the social conditions (DS and TS), protagonists asked about the
location of their liked or disliked fruit. On the other hand, under the less-social
conditions (DL and TL), protagonists asked about the location of a certain
fruit. See the Materials and Methods section for additional details.
(DL) and truth with less-social-context (TL) conditions, protag-
onists simply asked about the position of a certain fruit: “Is the
apple in the blue box?” Under these conditions, participants did
not need to consider the protagonists’ preference.
We adopted a rapid event-related design for fMRI data col-
lection. One trial took 13 s (animation: 8 s, response time: 5 s).
Trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized order with a jit-
tered inter-stimulus interval (ISI, minimum 2 s, maximum 6 s,
mean 4 s). Sixteen trials were conducted under each condition,
yielding a total of 64 trials (16 trials × 4 conditions).
PROCEDURE
Participants were asked to watch the short animated film and
answer a simple yes/no question for each trial. The girl was intro-
duced as a good character who should be helped to get the
fruit she sought. The witch was introduced as an evil charac-
ter who should be prevented from getting the fruit. Participants
were told, “In the animation, there were two protagonists: a
witch and a girl. They looked for some fruit, but they did not
know where it was. So, if the girl asks you about the posi-
tion of the fruit, you should always tell it to her. But when-
ever the witch asks you about the position of the fruit, you
should prevent from her getting it.” Before participants entered
the scanner, they completed a short practice task consisting of
two trials under each condition; the trials were self-paced to
maximize task comprehension. They also completed two addi-
tional trials per condition to practice answering within 5 s. If
they failed to answer the question correctly, we presented the
rules and explained the situation again. We confirmed that all
participants could answer all practice questions correctly. To
decrease fatigue, we divided the fMRI session into two ses-
sions. Half of the participants were pseudo-randomly assigned
to the DL/TL condition in the first session, and the other
half were pseudo-randomly assigned to the DS/TS condition in
the first session. Additionally, to reduce nervousness or anxi-
ety during scanning, participants looked at the MRI scanner
and listened to its scanning sound before entering the MRI
machine.
The animations were presented visually using customized
experimental control software (Presentation, Neurobehavioral
Systems, Inc., Albany, CA, USA). Data on the accuracy and
response time for all tasks were collected by this software.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION
All MRI data were acquired with a 3-T Philips Intera Achieva
scanner. Head motion was minimized by placing pillows and
cushions around the head. Forty axial slices (thickness, 4mm;
FOV, 224mm; data matrix, 64 × 64 voxels; in-plane resolution,
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3.5 × 3.5mm) were acquired every 2.2 s during functional
measurements (single-shot gradient-echo echoplanar imaging
sequence; TR = 2200ms; TE = 30ms; flip angle = 80◦). Within
one session, 225 volumes were acquired.
fMRI ANALYSES
The data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
Software version 8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK) implemented on MATLAB (The
Mathworks, Inc., Natic, MA, USA). Acquired volumes were
subjected to a standard preprocessing procedure (Ashburner and
Friston, 1997). Images were corrected for differences in timing
of slice acquisition, followed by rigid body motion correction.
Preprocessing further included spatially normalization to the
standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) adult EPI
template and smoothing with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of
8mm (FWHM). The reason why we used adult template for
normalization was that transformed brain morphology into
a common stereotactic space is relatively consistent between
children and adults (Burgund et al., 2002). Therefore, we used
the standard MNI EPI template for normalizing our data.
fMRI data ware analyzed using an event-related model. In
the first-level analysis, we created and estimated a general lin-
ear model (GLM). In the creation of the GLM, the hemody-
namic response for each event was modeled from the onset
of the appearance of the question to the minimum response
time under all four conditions. Participants were given 5 s to
press the response button. If participants could answer the
question within 3 s, they no longer needed to consider the
question. We used this minimum response time to eliminate
cognitive processing following answers. Trials with errors or no
response were modeled as events of no interest. A high-pass
filter of 1/128Hz was used to remove low-frequency noise. In
the first-level analysis, we created the contrast between brain
activations under DS + DL and TS + TL conditions for each
participant in order to identify the main effect of deception.
Additionally, to identify the main effect of social context, we
compared the contrast under DS + TS and DL + TL condi-
tions. In the interaction comparisons, the contrast (DS − DL)
− (TS − TL) was used. We also created following contrasts;
DS − DL, DS − TS, DS − TL, and TS − TL to use for mask
images.
To assess the neural activities under deception and social-
context conditions, we performed second-level one-sample t-test
analyses by using the first-level contrasts. First, the main effect
of deception was determined by comparing brain activity under
the deception (DS + DL) and the truth (TS + TL). This con-
trast was masked inclusively by DS − TS and DL − TL for the
main effect of deception. In a similar way, to investigate the neu-
ral correlates of social context, we compared the social (DS + TS)
and the less-social (DL + TL). This contrast was masked inclu-
sively by DS − DL and TS − TL. Second, in the interaction
effect between deception and social context was determined using
the contrast (DS − DL) − (TS − TL) with inclusive mask of
DS − DL, DS − TS, and DS − TL. This contrast and mask pro-
cedure enabled us to identify brain areas that showed greater
difference among DS and other three conditions.
For all the whole-brain subtraction analyses, the statistical
threshold was set at P < 0.001 for height, and the FWE was cor-
rected to P < 0.05 for multiple comparisons using cluster size,
assuming the entire brain as a search volume. A liberal statistical
threshold for the mask contrasts was set at P < 0.05 for height,
without a correction for multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
We performed a Two-Way ANOVA with reply type (decep-
tion/truth) and context (social/less social) as the independent
variables and accuracy as the dependent variable. We found a
significant main effect of context [F(3, 36) = 13.18, P < 0.001;
Table 1]. Participants performed significantly better under the
less-social than under the social conditions. We also performed
a Two-Way ANOVA with reply type and context as independent
variables and reaction time as the dependent variable. The anal-
ysis revealed a significant main effect of reply type and context
[reply type: F(3, 36) = 5.44, P < 0.05; context: F(3, 36) = 25.48,
P < 0.001; Table 1]. Participants responded to the question faster
under the truth and less-social conditions than under the decep-
tion and social conditions.
fMRI DATA
The second-level group analysis revealed significant activation for
the main effect of mentalizing. We found significant right pre-
cuneus activation for the (DS + TS) – (DL + TL) contrast. We
found significant IPL activation for the (DS + DL) – (TS + TL)
contrast using the more liberal statistical threshold (P < 0.001,
FWE corrected P < 0.1 by cluster size). However, we did not
find any significant interactions. Brain areas showing signifi-
cant or marginally significant activation are listed in Table 2 and
Figure 2.
DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study investigat-
ing the neural correlates of deceptive behavior in social con-
texts in normally developing children. Overall, the results were
partially consistent with the hypotheses. First, the comparison
between social-context conditions and less-social-context con-
ditions showed that the right precuneus was significantly more
activated under the social than under the less-social condi-
tion. Second, we found marginally greater IPL activation under
the deception compared with under the truth conditions. Since
the interaction between deception and social context did not
reach a significant level, the hypothesis that the medial aspect
Table 1 | Behavioral data.
Variable Deception Truth
Social Less-social Social Less-social
Accuracy (trials) 13.5± 1.51 15.7± 0.48 14.3± 0.82 15.7± 0.48
Reaction time (s) 4.09± 0.34 3.45± 0.54 3.82± 0.33 3.1± 0.46
Mean accuracy score and reaction time under each condition are shown. Values
are means ± standard deviations.
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Table 2 | Cortical areas activated as the main effect under social and
deception conditions.
Contrast/area Peak activation Cluster size (mm3)
Coordinates t
x y z
SOCIAL (DS AND TS) – LESS-SOCIAL (DL AND TL)
R precuneus* 8 −64 48 9.70 1112
2 −56 48 8.72
24 −58 30 6.76
DECEPTION (DS AND DL) – TRUTH (TS AND TL)
R Inferior parietal lobule† 54 −54 46 10.14 156
50 −56 56 7.39
DS, deception with social context; TS, truth with social context; DL, deception
with less-social-context; TL, truth with less-social-context.
*P < 0.001 corrected by cluster level P < 0.05.
†P < 0.001 corrected by cluster level P < 0.1.
of the prefrontal cortex was responsible for integrating the pro-
cess involved in deception and mentalizing was not proven in
normally developing children.
PRECUNEUS ACTIVATION IN THE SOCIAL CONTEXT CONDITIONS
The activation of the precuneus observed under the social-context
conditions suggested that this region is related to the cognitive
processes underlying taking the perspective of another person.
Indeed, this region has been among the areas associated with
mentalizing (Saxe, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2007). Participants in
the present study were required to infer the preference of the pro-
tagonist from the character’s facial expression. Additionally, some
researchers have deduced that the precuneus plays a role in the
cognitive processing involved in retrieving past events, especially
those experienced by others (Shallice et al., 1994; Lundstrom
et al., 2005). These cognitive processes would be required to
respond to the question asking participants about the prefer-
ence of the protagonist. On the other hand, Mohamed et al.
(2006) speculated that precuneus activation was related to the
FIGURE 2 | Brain areas showing brain activation during (A) the social
conditions compared with the less-social conditions, and (B) the
deception conditions comparedwith the truth conditions.Activation in the
right precuneus areas was significantly greater under the social than under the
less-social conditions. Activation in the right inferior parietal lobule was
marginally greater under the deception than under the truth conditions. These
bar graphs showed the parameter estimates of each condition in the right
precuneusand the right inferior parietal lobule. Error barsmeant standarderrors.
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ability to determine whether one’s own mental imagery is cor-
rect. They found greater activation in the precuneus when they
contrasted reactions to a lie about a mock crime (e.g., fir-
ing a gun) with those to the truth. In that study, participants
retrieved information about their own behavior to offer a decep-
tive reply about whether they had actually committed a mock
crime. However, in the present study, the tasks involved cog-
nitive processing about protagonists’ rather than participants’
mental imagery. Therefore, it is less likely that precuneus acti-
vation observed in the present study was involved in the mental
imagery related to the participants themselves. In this context, we
assumed that the observed precuneus activation reflected the pro-
cesses involved in taking the perspective of another person and in
retrieving the information needed to infer the preference of the
protagonist.
IPL ACTIVATION IN THE DECEPTION CONDITIONS
We found that activation in the IPL of normally developing
children was associated with processing related to deception.
This result is partially consistent with previous fMRI stud-
ies in adults that found IPL activations were associated with
deceptive behavior (Spence et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2002; Kozel
et al., 2005; Nunez et al., 2005; Abe et al., 2006) and with
executive functioning, especially when response inhibition was
involved (Rubia et al., 2001; Simmonds et al., 2008). These
studies assumed that IPL activation was responsible for the
inhibition of the prepotent response. Simmonds et al. (2008)
hypothesized that frontal–parietal circuits were recruited in
response to inhibition tasks, especially when working memory
was necessary to guide response inhibition. Consistent with these
results, the present study found that IPL activation indicated
inhibition of a prepotent (true) response to deceive another
person.
Contrary to our hypotheses, we did not find a main effect of
activation in the prefrontal regions associated with deception, the
social context, or the interaction of deception and social con-
text. This may have been due to the immaturity of prefrontal
regions. A number of investigators have examined the differ-
ential maturation of response inhibition in frontal and parietal
cortices (Booth et al., 2003; Rubia et al., 2006). Bunge et al.
(2002) compared the brain activation exhibited by 8–12-year-old
children during an inhibition task with that exhibited by adults
and concluded that adults activated frontal and parietal regions
during an inhibition task, whereas children activated only pari-
etal regions. Additionally, only a few studies have investigated
differences between adolescents and adults in the brain corre-
lates of mentalizing (Ohnishi et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2006;
Williams, 2008; Sommer et al., 2010; van den Bos et al., 2011;
Moor et al., 2012; Sebastian et al., 2012). These studies indicated
that young participants (aged 10–12 years) tended to show more
activation in prefrontal regions than did adults (Sommer et al.,
2010; Moor et al., 2012) and that the activation pattern shifted
from prefrontal to occipitotemporal regions during development
(Wang et al., 2006; Sebastian et al., 2012). Those researchers
assumed that this shift occurred due to the increasingly auto-
matic nature of the cognitive processing. In the present study, we
did not find any significant activation in the prefrontal regions.
However, the participants in previous studies were older than
10 years of age and thus older than participants in the present
study. Taki et al. (2011) found that prefrontal regions develop
later than do other brain areas. Taken together, the results of
the present study may be interpreted as indicating that chil-
dren younger than 10 years do not use the prefrontal regions
efficiently because of the immaturity of these regions. As the
prefrontal regions mature, activations in these regions would be
expected to increase. Subsequently, increases in automatic cogni-
tive processing would be associated with decreased activation in
the prefrontal regions.
LIMITATIONS
One limitation of the present study is its small sample size for
statistical analyses. Therefore, a larger sample study is needed
in order to confirm these findings in future studies. We elim-
inated 12 participants (43%) due to problems with accuracy.
This ratio is relatively larger than that in other studies of chil-
dren (Sommer et al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 2012). We assumed
that the unsuccessful trials of some participants may have been
due to the unfamiliarity of the MRI environment (e.g., sound of
the scanner, darkness, or narrow space) rather than to task dif-
ficulty. Participants practiced with same situation used for fMRI
tasks (i.e., they watched the same animated video and used the
same response pad) for four trials per condition (total of 16 tri-
als). During the practice phase, we confirmed that participants
could answer the question with 100% accuracy compared with
only 70% accuracy during scanning. Therefore, we concluded that
participants found it difficult to concentrate on the tasks due to
the MRI environment. In order to get use to scanning environ-
ment, the training in a mock scanner might be required for young
children.
Secondly there might be a potential confond between con-
ditions and the character in our tasks. Because the girl always
appeared in the truth conditions (TL and TS) and the witch
always appeared in the deception conditions (DL and DS), the
processing involved in seeing a novel face did not cancel out in the
subtraction of deception minus truth; (DS + DL) – (TS + TL).
However, the neural activities such as novel face processing (e.g.,
witch’s face in the present study) were found in right hippocam-
pus, left prefrontal and temporal cortices (Grady et al., 1995),
right hippocampus and bilateral prefrontal cortices (Haxby et al.,
1996). Therefore, we considered that the activation in right IPL
that we found as deception processing in the present study might
be related to the processing of deception itself, not novel face.
CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to clarify
the neural correlates of deception in social contexts in normally
developing children. We found that processing in social con-
texts involves the precuneus. Taken together with the results
of previous fMRI studies on mentalizing, our results suggest
that this region played a role in the perspective taking and
memory retrieval required to infer the protagonist’s preference.
Additionally, we foundmarginal activation in the right IPL during
deception processing, which we related to the inhibition of prepo-
tent responses. These results contribute to clarifying an essential
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aspect of deceptive behavior in normally developing children.
Moreover, these results should be helpful in investigations of neu-
ral abnormalities in children with neurodevelopmental disorders
such ASD. Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find any sig-
nificant activation of interaction between deception and social
contexts. This might suggest that deception is not modulated by
social factors.
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